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Climate Change, Water, and China’s Security:
Implications for Global Cooperation on Climate Change
Scott Moore1
Abstract
This paper links the issues of climate change, water, and China’s security, arguing that the
water-related impacts of climate change post significant strategic challenges for China and
Asia, with consequent implications for China’s participation and engagement in global
climate change cooperation efforts. Specifically, water-related climate impacts will strain the
capacity of many key public institutions, and imperil the government’s strategic development
objectives. Recognizing these imperatives points the way toward a strategic dialogue with
China on climate change. This paper first discusses scientific assessments of predicted
hydrological changes in China and neighboring countries under climate change, progressing
to a security analysis of the challenges these changes pose, and finally discusses how Chinese
policymakers and commentators view climate change and water as geopolitical issues. This
paper concludes by examining implications for global climate cooperation.
Introduction: Linking Climate Change, Water, and China’s Security
As the world approaches the international climate negotiations at Copenhagen in December
2009, the two imperatives of promoting economic development and protecting the global
atmospheric commons seem increasingly to stand at odds. Even as scientific assessments of
the impacts of climate change grow more urgent, large developing nations like China and
India continue to prioritize their own economic goals. Given the difficulties in resolving this
impasse, it is helpful to think broadly about all dimensions of the climate change problem,
social, political, economic and ecological.
This paper seeks a role in this debate by examining the strategic-security implications
for China of a changing climate, with specific reference to water issues. It does so chiefly
with an eye towards evaluating the contribution that such a perspective can make to shaping
China’s participation in global cooperation on climate change. Most commentators agree that
China will play a crucial role in finalizing a post-2012 climate agreement; from this
perspective, there is clear value to seeking a security imperative in its approach to
international cooperation on climate change. As international relations scholar Katherine
Morton has pointed out, the value in “securitizing” the climate issue is that “In situations
where there is a growing international consensus that a problem exists, but limited consensus
on the most effective and fair method of dealing with it, a preventive security approach
encourages action on the basis of a pragmatic calculation that prevention is better than cure”
(Morton, 2008, p. 54).2
The argument presented here is that water-related impacts of climate change imperil
many of China’s strategic development objectives, presenting an opportunity for foreign
countries to engage the country in a strategic dialogue on climate cooperation. This paper
first presents a scientific assessment of water-related climate change impacts, both in China
and its neighboring countries. Next, it discusses strategic and security implications for
China’s foreign relations, domestic issues like food security, and also internal stability. The
final section of the paper discusses discourse on climate change, water, and security topics
within China, pursuing an understanding of how such discourse could help frame the
1
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country’s participation in an international, strategic dialogue on climate change issues. This
multifaceted approach, spanning the physical and social sciences, frames the Conclusions
section, which identifies cross-cutting issues related to water, climate change, and China’s
security and also discusses implications for global climate cooperation.
This integration of climate change, water, and Chinese security issues is timely for
several reasons. First, many of the most severe likely impacts of climate change in China and
Asia generally are water-related, such as a predicted long-term decline in water runoff from
the Himalayan region (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 1997, p. 15). Second,
there is growing recognition of the linkages between water availability, conflict, and security
issues in Asia. As a recent Asia Society report notes, “more than one billion people in Asia
alone are projected to experience negative impacts on water resources as a result of climate
change…Over time, these effects will have a profound impact on security throughout the
region” (Asia Society, 2009, p. 7). Finally, climate change is becoming an important issue in
China’s relations with the rest of the world, as indicated by the recent visit of US Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton to Beijing (Landler, 2009). Despite this confluence of factors, few
commentators have focused specifically on the implications for China’s security of waterrelated climate impacts. It is thus high time to do so.
Before delving into this discussion, the linkages between climate change, water, and
security require further articulation. Recent decades have witnessed the gradual broadening
of the concept of security from its traditional political and military foundations. In an
influential 1989 article, former US government official Jessica Mathews called for a
redefinition of national security to “include resource, environmental and demographic issues”
(Mathews, 1989, p. 162). Subsequent research and scholarship has given prominence to the
field of environmental security, which in one articulation “is central to national security,
comprising the dynamics and interconnections among the natural resource base, the social
fabric of the state, and the economic engine for local and regional stability” (Institute for
Environmental Security, 2004).
Several strands of environmental security and related discourse are of relevance to
this paper. First is a growing body of scholarship that has identified clear, though contextspecific linkages between resources scarcity, environmental change, and conflict, particularly
at the sub-national level (Homer-Dixon, Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict:
Evidence from cases, 1994). As a recent United Nations report concluded, “Environmental
factors are rarely if ever the sole cause of conflict, but exploitation of resources is present in
each stage of the conflict cycle” (United Nations Environment Program, 2009, p. 5). Second
is the increasing focus of many institutions with a traditional security focus on climate change
and instability. In 2007 the United Nations Security Council held its first-ever debate on
climate change, and a major US Centre for Naval Analyses report found that “Climate change
acts as a threat multiplier for instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world”
(Center for Naval Analyses, 2007, p. 6).
In addition, the concept of human security is relevant to discussions of some of the
water-related impacts China is likely to face as a result of climate change. According to one
widely accepted definition, “The objective of human security is to safeguard the vital core of
all human lives from critical pervasive threats, in a way that is consistent with long-term
human fulfilment” (Alkire, 2002). Human security thus entails issues, such as an equitable
distribution of resources, that do not fall within more traditional or restrictive conceptions of
security (Morton, 2008, p. 54). Here, however, the value of a human security perspective is
that it facilitates the analysis of water-related climate impacts within the context of China’s
pervasive regional, ethnic, and economic disparities.
Applying these broadened conceptions of security to water-related climate impacts
focuses this paper on the social and political consequences of shifting water resource
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distributions within China. from this perspective, it is possible to understand more concretely
the security consequences of a changing climate in china, and to discuss how these
consequences can and should guide both Chinese and international approaches to global
climate cooperation. To begin this discussion, this paper turns now to a scientific assessment
of water-related climate impacts for China and its Asian neighbours.
Water-Related Climate Change Impacts in China and Asia: the Scientific Basis
The eastern portion of the Asian landmass, of which China is a part, faces particularly acute
changes in water availability and distribution as a result of climate change. While climate
modeling is subject to significant uncertainties, this section identifies two such changes
which are of particular relevance to non-traditional security issues (discussed in the
subsequent section). First, the incidence of extreme water-related phenomena, such as
prolonged drought and severe flooding, is likely to increase. Second, some regions, many of
them already under water stress, are likely to be heavily, and perhaps catastrophically,
impacted by changes in water availability. This section indicates that, based on existing
scientific research, whatever the precise nature and distribution of water-related climate
change impacts in China and its neighboring countries, they will be acute and pervasive.
Many Asian nations are already under water stress, and the Asian continent has the
lowest per-capita water allocation of any continent save Antarctica (Asia Society, 2009, p. 9);
(See Table 1 below).
Table 1: Water Resources and Dependency (From
Region's Water Future, p. 44)
Total
Internal
Renewable
Country
Water
Resources
(km3)
Afghanistan
55
Australia
492
Bangladesh
105
Cambodia
121
China
2,812
India
1,261
Indonesia
2,838
Iran
128
Japan
430
Kazakhstan
75
Kyrgyzstan
46
Laos
190
Malaysia
580
Mongolia
45
Myanmar
881
Nepal
198
Pakistan
55
Philippines
479
South Korea
65
Sri Lanka
50
Thailand
210
United States 2,800
Uzbekistan
16
Vietnam
366

Asia Society, Asia's Next Challenge: Securing the
Total
External
Renewable
Water
Resources
(km3)
10
0
1,106
356
17
636
0
9
0
34
-26
143
0
0
165
12
170
0
5
0
200
51
34
525
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Dependency
Ratio (%)

15
0
91
75
1
34
0
7
0
31
0
43
0
0
16
6
77
0
7
0
49
8
77
59

Moreover, as a recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report has
concluded, “Asia has a very high population that is growing at a fast rate, low development
levels and weak coping capacity. Climate change is expected to exacerbate the water scarcity
situation in Asia, together with multiple socio-economic stresses” (Bates, Kundzewicz, Wu,
& Palutikof, 2008, p. 85). In India, for example, over-exploitation of groundwater resources
and population growth is expected to reduce per capita water availability by almost 50% by
2025 (China Daily, 2007, p. 6). In north China, the water use to availability ratio was three to
four times the level in the south as of 2000 (Shalizi, 2006, p. 8). In China and its immediate
neighbourhood, climate change threatens to exacerbate this already tenuous water situation in
several ways.
The hydrology of Eastern Asia is dominated by two processes: atmospheric
circulation, principally the Asiatic monsoon and El Nino-Southern Oscillation (ENSO), as
well as a snow- and glacial-melt regime situated on the Himalayan region (Barnett, Adam, &
Lettenmaier, 2005); (Xu, Takeuchi, & Ishidaira, 2004, p. 108).
In China, for example,
changes in aridity are determined primarily by summer precipitation, mostly the East Asian
monsoon (Yang, Ding, Chen, & Liu, 2005, p. 177). Atmospheric circulation, though
relatively poorly understood, appears to be set to increase the variability of precipitation and
the risk of flooding as a result of climate change, while glacial melting will cause significant
changes in the flow of Asia’s major rivers. Both have the potential to impose large economic
costs and to disrupt agriculture.
China’s National Climate Change Program asserts that “climate change has already
caused changes [in] water resources distribution over China,” focusing particularly on an
increase in “hydrological extreme events” such as drought in the north and flooding in the
south (National Development and Reform Commission, 2007, p. 22). This assessment draws
largely from IPCC data indicating an observed increase in precipitation in north and
northeastern China, and a marked increase in the west (Chang Jiang delta region) and
southeast (Bates, Kundzewicz, Wu, & Palutikof, 2008, pp. 85-86). Yang, et al., for example,
note that as a result of climate change precipitation is decreasing in eastern China agricultural
areas, with drought-related agricultural losses increasing steadily since the mid-twentieth
century (Yang, Ding, Chen, & Liu, 2005, p. 184). Tao, et al. similarly predicted that soil
degradation under a changing climate would lead to higher probability of “disastrous drought
and floods” in central, southwestern, and northeastern China (Tao, Yokozawa, Hayashi, &
Lin, 2005, p. 169).
A tendency toward more extreme climate events is also predicted for other regions. A
major study of the Indian Himalaya found that climate change will increase the variation of
seasonal flows significantly (Singh, Arora, & Goel, 2006, p. 1991). In the Mekong,
Southeast Asia’s most important river system, maximum monthly flows are expected to
increase by 35-41% by mid-to late century over 20th century levels in the river basin, while
the minimum monthly flows are expected to decline by 17-24% (Bates, Kundzewicz, Wu, &
Palutikof, 2008, p. 87).
Such increased variation threatens to disrupt normal economic and agricultural
activity in vulnerable regions, and as the IPCC has noted, “there could be increased flooding
risks [in the Mekong region] during the wet season and an increased possibility of water
shortages in the dry season” (Bates, Kundzewicz, Wu, & Palutikof, 2008, p. 87). In the case
of the Mekong, this variability is enhanced by additional risks from sea level rise and
resulting salt water intrusion poses a profound threat to agricultural production in the river’s
delta region (Wassmann, Hien, Hoanh, & Tuong, 2004, p. 89).
Potentially even more serious, however, is a predicted long-term decline in water
availability as Himalayan glaciers melt and snow packs are reduced in size. The IPCC
estimates that a decrease in Himalayan glacier mass of about 25% is possible by 2050 as
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global temperatures rise (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 1997, p. 14). This is
significant as glacial melt water accounts for some 70% of summer flow in the Ganges river
system, and 50-60% of the flow in other major Asian river systems (Barnett, Adam, &
Lettenmaier, 2005, p. 306). One major study predicted that Himalayan melt-fed water
systems would peak at 150-170% of initial flow by 2050-2070, with annual mean flow
declining thereafter by 33% and 4-18% less in the western and eastern Himalayan regions,
respectively (Rees & Collins, 2006, pp. 2167-2168). As Barnett, et al. conclude, a significant
portion of northwest China and northern India will be subject to declining water availability
by the end of the century, as seasonal water shortages arrive abruptly, “going from plenty to
want in perhaps a few decades” (Barnett, Adam, & Lettenmaier, 2005, pp. 304-306).
Nonetheless, there is likely to be substantial regional variability in these effects.
Some river basins are likely to be particularly heavily impacted; the Tarim River for instance,
Xinjiang’s most important river system, depends on glacial melt water for 40% of its mean
annual flow (Liu & Chen, 2006, p. 298). Other areas of north-western China are likely to be
severely impacted by changes in water availability. As the IPCC has reported, “The duration
of seasonal snow cover in [Chinese] alpine areas – namely the Tibet Plateau, Xinjiang and
Inner Mongolia– is expected to shorten, leading to a decline in volume and resulting in severe
spring droughts. Between 20% and 40% reductions in runoff per capita in Ningxia, Xinjiang
and Qinghai Provinces are likely by the end of the 21st century” italics original (Bates,
Kundzewicz, Wu, & Palutikof, 2008, p. 87).
Changes of similar magnitude are predicted for major river systems elsewhere in
China and Asia. A major study by Manabe, et al., which attempted to model the effects of a
quadrupling of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations above pre-industrial levels,
concluded that most major Asian rivers, including the Chang Jiang (Yangtze) and Huang He
(Yellow River) in China, and the Ganga/Brahmaputra in the Indian Subcontinent, were likely
to experience large increases in flow on a one-hundred year timescale, but that the Mekong
was expected to experience a 6% decrease (S. Manabe, Milly, Delworth, & Stouffer, 2004, p.
65); (see Table 2 below).
Table 2: Changes in flow of major East Asian rivers under climate change (Adapted from S. Manabe,
Milly, Delworth, & Stouffer, 2004, p. 65)
River system
%
change
in
annual mean rates
of
simulated
discharge (D, 103
m3 s−1)

Chang Jiang

Huang He

Ganga/Brahmaputra

Mekong

+28

+18

+49

-6

Uncertainty and variability are also dominant themes in projections of changes
regarding precipitation patterns. For instance, in a wide-ranging simulation of climactic and
soil conditions, Tao et al. predicted that areas of central, western, and south-western China
would face large soil-moisture deficits as a result of climate change, which in turn reduces
precipitation (Tao, Yokozawa, Hayashi, & Lin, 2005, p. 193). The IPPC, however, notes that
2/3 of modelling studies on the same area predicts an increase in precipitation (Bates,
Kundzewicz, Wu, & Palutikof, 2008, p. 88).
While some studies suggest that in north China only 70% of irrigation needs can be
met under climate change scenarios, a major study of Chinese agricultural production under
climate change indicates that the country will be able to meet its food requirements under any
of the IPCC climate warming scenarios, assuming a carbon-dioxide fertilization effect
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(Xiong, Lin, Ju, & Xu, 2007, p. 208).3 Other research has broadly supported this conclusion,
predicting increased production of staple food crops in China (Lobell, Burke, Tebaldi,
Mastrandrea, Falcon, & Naylor, 2008, p. 609) and an increase in global food production
generally under various climate change scenarios (Parry, Rosenzweig, Iglesias, Livermore, &
Fischer, 2004, p. 63).
The best summary of these potential water-related climate impacts appears to be that
water distribution patterns will become much more variable. Another characterization might
be that many areas of China are likely to have too much water when they don’t need it (i.e.,
flooding during the rainy season) and too little when they do (the dry summer months).
Certain areas, such as northern and north-western China and the Mekong river system, will be
more impacted, and by a greater combination of factors, than others. This conclusion has
important implications for both China’s national and regional security.
Strategic-Security Analysis of Water-Related Climate Impacts in China and
Surrounding Countries
The scientific assessment presented above predicts that water-related climate impacts will be
acute not only in China, but in surrounding nations as well. As a result, this strategic-security
analysis first considers implications for China’s regional security and foreign relations, before
turning inward, to examine threats posed to food production, disaster management capacities,
and internal stability within China. This section argues that water-related climate impacts
will stress the disaster response and emergency management capacities of key institutions,
such as the armed forces, and imperil many of the government’s key strategic development
objectives, such as the Western Development Strategy.
It is clear that water-related climate impacts spill over China’s borders, which will
increase the importance of water issues in China’s foreign and regional security policies.
Indeed, regional actors are already expressing growing concern over such water issues. At the
2008 World Economic Forum, 81% of business leaders ranked climate change and water
issues as being those of greatest concern to Asia (Info-Prod Research, 2008). The Filipino
Defense Secretary made a similar pronouncement with his recent statement that climate
change is a greater long-term threat to his country’s security than religious or social conflict,
in large part due to water supply concerns (Antiporda, 2009).
This concern is reflected in the attitudes of China’s neighbours. In Pakistan, for
instance, officials have suggested that changes in Himalayan melt water could devastate
agriculture in this already fragile country (Das, 2008). A recent study from the Earth Policy
Institute makes clear the heavy dependence of vast numbers of people on glacial melt waterfed agriculture (Brown, 2008); (see Table 3 below). Given such dependence, transboundary
water issues are certain to become an issue of growing importance for China. As the Asia
Society’s report on water and security has concluded, hydropolitics will be an increasingly
potent force in Asian security (Asia Society, 2009, p. 13).

3

A carbon-dioxide fertilization effect asserts that increased fixation of carbon dioxide, resulting in increased
crop growth and yield. However, the extent of CO2 fertilization effects is contentious. See, for example, L.
Hartwall Allen, Jeff Baker and Ken Boote, “The CO2 fertilization effect: higher carbohydrate production and
retention
as
biomass
and
seed
yield,”
Food
and
Agriculture
Organization,
http://www.fao.org/docrep/W5183E/w5183e06.htm, accessed May 26, 2009.
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Table 3: Vulnerability of major Asian river systems to changes in glacial melt water (Adapted from Earth
Policy Institute and U.N. Environment Programme, Global Outlook for Ice and Snow (Nairobi, Kenya:
2007), p. 131)

River system

Population
(million)

Tarim
Indus
Ganges
Brahmaputra
Chang Jiang
Yellow
Mekong

8
178
407
118
368
147
57

Basin
area
(thousand square
kilometres)
1152
1082
1016
651
1722
945
806

Cropland (%)

Dependence
on
glacial melt water

2
30
72
29
48
30
38

Very high
Very high
High
High
High
High
Moderate

In particular, certain Asian river systems seem to be more contentious than others.
Based on their study of conflict and cooperation over water, Yoffee, et al. developed a
“Basins at Risk” indicator, which ranks the Ganges, Indus, and Mekong as at risk for conflict
(Yoffe, Wolf, & Giordano, 2003, p. 1123). Among these, the Mekong River System presents
particular challenges for China’s security. Relations between China and its downstream
neighbours in the Mekong basin have long been fragile (Morton, 2008, p. 8). This situation is
likely to be exacerbated by the construction of several dams in Chinese territory, which
restrict flow to downstream nations. If, as climate models suggest, water flow to the Mekong
becomes more variable under climate change, China’s “asymmetric” control of the river’s
headwaters will become an issue of even greater concern to Southeast Asian nations (Asia
Society, 2009, p. 17).
This particular power asymmetry is of special significance, since Yoffee, et al.’s
research suggests that a high density of dams is associated with conflictive behaviour, unless
freshwater treaties are involved (Yoffe, Wolf, & Giordano, 2003, p. 1116). China has
steadfastly refused to join such “hard law” regimes in the Mekong region (Nielsen, 2007, p.
217). Thus, it seems reasonable to assert that China will have to improve its cooperative
frameworks if it is to avoid significant diplomatic tension with Mekong nations as the flow of
the river changes along with the climate. Simply put, Beijing will almost certainly have to
devote more diplomatic attention to the Mekong and other potential Asian “water hotspots”
as climate change impacts accelerate.
In mainland China, specific regional impacts also appear to represent the most
pressing security challenges. Several of China’s most strategically important regions are
predicted to suffer significant water resource shortages as a result of climate change. As
Barnett, et al. have observed, some 23% of China’s population lives in western regions where
glacial melt water provides the principal dry season water source (Barnett, Adam, &
Lettenmaier, 2005, p. 306), and as glaciers melt, water will become increasingly scarce
during the dry season. One study, describing the disappearance of an oasis in north-western
Gansu province, attributes climate change for causing a decrease in stream flow during the
summer months. This decrease in water availability is inducing desertification, which
exacerbated by population growth has imposed serious socioeconomic costs on an already
poor area (Kang, Su, Tong, Zhang, Zhang, & Davies, 2008, p. 444). Such impacts are
particularly significant since these western regions are not only impoverished, but also the
most restive in China, being home to ethnic minorities who have long mounted challenges to
Beijing’s rule (Davis, 2008).
These Changes in water availability in China’s restive northwest can pose security
challenges in two primary ways. First, competition over scarce resources can exacerbate
existing tensions between China’s majority Han ethnic group and minority groups such as the
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Tibetans and Uyghur (Bhattacharji, 2008). As the Asia Society report has concluded, “One
could certainly foresee the potential for conflict as urbanization and industry begin to deplete
already scarce water supplies, particularly if certain Han-run businesses are perceived to be
receiving favourable treatment in water resource allotment” (Asia Society, 2009, p. 19). One
Chinese scholar has similarly noted the danger environmental change poses for the success of
the country’s much-touted Western Development Strategy (Xibu da kaifa), saying “The
environment of the West itself is the foundation of the Western Development Strategy” (Lu,
2008).
Second, water scarcity could increase the numbers of “environmental refugees” from
China’s northwest, potentially inflaming ethnic tensions and increasing socioeconomic
burdens (round out this sentence) as they seek opportunity elsewhere in China. A study by
Kang, et al. found that increasing numbers of farmers in Gansu province are abandoning their
lands as a result of “the rapid deterioration of [their] water environment” (Kang, Su, Tong,
Zhang, Zhang, & Davies, 2008, p. 446). Similar phenomena have been described in Tibet,
where a variety of challenges are inducing higher rates of out-migration of ethnic Tibetans
(Morton, Climate Change on the Tibetan Pleateau: a new human security challenge, 2009).
In the high Himalaya, minorities may be affected less by water shortages and more by
increasing exposure to geologic hazards, such as the threat of flooding from glacial melt
waters and landslides as permafrost melts (Hewitt, 2009). Nonetheless, the potential for
environmental refugee outflows to increase exists in both regions.
The danger posed by such environmental refugees4 is that they may be deprived of the
means to sustain livelihoods in their new homes. Research has indicated that gradual
environmental deterioration, as may be expected under climate change, affects the very poor
disproportionately; already bereft of resources, they have little capacity to re-establish
themselves elsewhere (Bates D. , 2002, p. 469). As Yan and Qian have described, arable
land is scare in China, and environmental refugees, pulled away from their livelihoods and
kinship networks, often have great difficulties in setting up livelihoods when forced to
resettle (Yan & Qian, 2004, pp. 631-632). Research by environmental security scholars has
further indicated that this dislocation can cause significant social stability issues. In
particular, as a result of environmental scarcity “people migrate in large numbers to regions
where resources seem more plentiful, only to fight with the people already there. Or they
migrate to urban slums, where unemployed young men can be primed to join criminal gangs
or radical political groups” (Homer-Dixon, Terror in the weather forecast, 2007).
Additionally, climate-related water shortages pose threats to China’s food security.
The north China winter drought of 2008-2009, which China’s National Meteorology Centre
classified as an “extreme weather event” (Jiduan qihou shijian) attributable to climate change
(Liu Y. , 2009), illustrates these security implications. This drought, which occurred during
the winter of 2008-2009, was the worst in 30 years, and affected China’s principal wheatgrowing areas, damaging 2.7 million mu of farmland 5 (Zhang & Wang, 2009). News
reported indicated that about 40% of China’s winter wheat crop would be affected (Li, 2009),
and that the drought was expected to decrease the wheat harvest, one of China’s most
important, by 5% nationally, and by 20% in some areas, such as Henan province (Xinhua
News Agency, 2009).
The scale of such effects has led many commentators to warn that climate-related
drought in north China could threaten the country’s food security (Liu S. , 2009). Political
factors dictate that food security is an especially sensitive issue in China, as the government
4

There is a technical though important distinction between “refugee” and “migrant.” Refugees, according to the
United Nations, are persons who are compelled to migrate by external factors, while migrants are those who
choose to do so for other, typically economic reasons.
5
This figure is equivalent to approximately 180,000 hectares (1 mu= 0.0667 hectares).
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is anxious to insulate the large population of rural poor from food price shocks (Brown,
2008). While it is unclear whether, as Xiong, et al. have indicated, climate change will
actually threaten China’s total domestic food supply, it is clear that the government cannot
afford to ignore extreme weather events, placing increasing pressure on the country’s military
and paramilitary institutions to develop disaster management and assistance capabilities.
Indeed, the drought provides an illustration of the increased need for such operations.
The paramilitary People’s Armed Police (Renmin wuzhuang jingcha) mobilized some 2400
troops over eight provinces, with commanders pledging to “make all-out efforts to fight the
drought and prevent disaster,” while also joining a “battle to snatch a bumper harvest.”
Additionally, assets from the People’s Liberation Army, including seven Air Force aircraft
and engineers from the country’s strategic nuclear forces, were called into service. The Jinan
Military District accompanied its mobilization with the exhortation to “call upon the
[Sichuan] earthquake relief spirit” (Fachang kangdi jiuzai jingshen) (Wang, et al., 2009).
With climate models predicting increasing incidence of extreme weather events, China’s
military will be compelled to incorporate these domestic disaster response and assistance
capabilities more closely into its operational planning strategies.
In addition to posing challenges to the country’s military, it is clear that adaptation to
water-related climate impacts will impose serious economic costs upon China. Xinjiang
Province, for example, is building 59 reservoirs to collect melt water from the Himalaya’s
shrinking glaciers in attempt to address concerns about long-term water availability. The tenyear project is expected to cost 200 million RMB per year for at least the next three years
(Watts, 2009), a considerable sum for one of China’s poorer areas. A large-scale study by
Kirshen, et al. also sheds light on the costs of adaptation to water distribution changes in
China. After compiling water storage costs and modelling changing flow under various
climate change scenarios, the study indicated that water storage costs vary widely by region;
the cost of capturing 120 billion cubic meters of water are USD$4.5 billion in the southern Xi
Jiang river area, and less than USD$2 billion in the central Chang Jiang, for example. Most
noticeably, it will become increasingly difficult and expensive to enhance water storage
capacity (reservoirs, catchments, etc) in water-stressed areas like north China (Kirshen,
McCluskey, Voegl, & Strzepek, 2005, p. 327).
The security implications of water-related climate impacts can be fundamentally
characterized by the uncertainty they introduce with respect to overall water availability, food
security, and social stability. As one commentator has noted, climate change is an “engine of
destabilization” (Stuhltrager, 2008, p. 38).
This characterization seems particularly
appropriate with respect to China. Water-related climate impacts will be severe in several
regions, both within China and in its border regions. In addition, these impacts have the
potential to foster general instability. However, it is difficult to identify any of these security
implications as direct. What appears more certain, however, is that China’s military,
governmental institutions, and national resources will be increasingly burdened by climate
change and water issues. As a result, the government has been compelled to devote more
attention to these issues, a trend which is only likely to accelerate. With this conclusion in
mind, the next section investigates Chinese political and strategic discourse on climate
change and water issues.
The Geopolitics of Water and Climate in China
It is clear that the distribution and availability of water resources in China and neighbouring
countries will be severely impacted by climate change, a prospect which in turn entails
significant security implications. What remains is to assess how China perceives this
situation, and how it is responding. This final section thus discusses Chinese governmental?
Too broad reactions and discourse on climate change, water, and security. It first describes
28

changing Chinese perspectives on security, before more focusing more specifically on steps
that China has taken to address water-related climate impacts, both within and outside the
country’s borders. This section argues that the Chinese government is particularly concerned
about the consequences, both traditional security and otherwise, of water-related climate
change impacts, presenting opportunities to open a strategic, security-focused international
dialogue on climate change (addressed in the Conclusions section).
In recent years, Chinese analysts, have, mirroring their Western colleagues, have
articulated a broader conception of security. China’s “New Security Concept” (Xin anquan
guan), promulgated since the late 1990s, addresses environmental and social issues, and also
emphasizes cooperation and dialogue as a means of conducting foreign relations (Liu G. ,
2006). As a subset of this trend, China’s strategic studies and international relations
community has also devoted increasing attention to the potentially destabilizing impacts of
climate change. Citing the broadening definition of security in the West, Liu et al., for
example, advocate creating a special policy research group that focuses on the political and
security dimensions of environmental change (Liu, Ge, Fang, & Zhang, 2006, p. 350).
Chinese security commentators have been even more prolific in citing American
analyses of the security threats posed by climate. A series of such reports, including a
widely-read 2004 Department of Defense study, prompted commentary within China over the
possibility that climate-related resource shortages could lead to conflict or even war (Lin,
2005). Some non-official commentators have gone so far as to extrapolate upon such
analyses to suggest that the threat of water-related conflict may increase between China and
neighbouring countries (Guoji Xuanqu Daobao, 2004). Several more official Chinese
commentators have similarly but more soberly cited American national security analyses to
focus on the potential for water-related conflict to increase in politically unstable regions of
the world, such as the Middle East (Tong, 2007).
The Chinese government, in contrast, does not appear to view climate change, or any
of its attendant impacts, as a security issue. For most officials, climate change simply does
not rise to the level of national security (Zha, 2009). Moreover, Beijing has strongly opposed
United Nations efforts to link climate change and security through debating climate change
issues in the Security Council. China Daily, the country’s official English-language
newspaper, editorialized that “The call for the international community to address climate
change is sensible, but sensationalizing it as an issue of security is conspiratorial” (China
Daily Editorial Board, 2007). A separate China Daily report quoted China’s deputy
representative to the United Nations as saying, "Discussing climate change at the Security
Council will not help countries in their efforts to mitigate its effects” (Le, 2007).
Moreover, the Chinese government has proven to be visibly reticent on some major
transboundary water issues. It has consistently refused to participate in the Mekong Basin
Commission (Morton, 2008, p. 58), despite the fact the Mekong system’s headwaters are all
in China, making it impossible to fashion a comprehensive water management system
without Beijing. China has also been hesitant to support the creation of an International
Biosphere Reserve in the Tumen River Delta area, since most of the environmental threats to
the area come from China (Nam, 2005).
The picture becomes a bit more complicated when this analysis is expanded to nongovernmental sources. Among Chinese security and international relations analysts, climaterelated security issues are not taken very seriously (Zha, 2009). Nonetheless, several
prominent Chinese analysts are increasingly outspoken in their advocacy for greater USChina climate cooperation. Zhang Haibin, a professor at Peking University, has written that
“from a high-level strategic perspective actively promoting US-China climate cooperation
will advance the mutual interests of all of humanity” (Zhang H. , 2009). Meanwhile, Chinese
government media gave favourable coverage to the US Deputy National Security Adviser’s
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April 2009 message to China that the United States wished to enhance clean and renewable
energy technology cooperation (Wang, 2009).
In addition, water issues have become more prominent in China’s relations with some
neighbouring countries. China has in recent years concluded a number of agreements with
countries like Russia and Kazakhstan regarding the demarcation and protection of
transboundary rivers (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003). Furthermore, the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO), which Beijing initially promoted largely as a body for
expanding security cooperation and countering Western influence, has begun working on
water issues. The SCO’s 2004 meeting was devoted to water, and in 2005 the organization
signed a compact with the Association of Southeast Asian nations to broaden cooperation on
water resources (Asia Society, 2009, p. 38).
At the domestic level, Chinese officials appear to take very seriously the
consequences of water-related climate change impacts. Premier Wen Jiabao, for instance,
was quoted in 1998 as saying, “"The survival of the Chinese nation is threatened by the
country's shortage of water” (Plafker, 2005). Lin Erda, a prominent member of China’s
Agricultural Sciences Institute, has similarly called attention to the threat posed by retreating
glaciers, saying that these and other effects of climate change “directly threaten China’s food
security” (Lin, 2005). The recent winter drought of 2008-2009 also indicated the
government’s concern for water issues, with state media reporting in its wake that
“Agriculture is a top government priority… [In early 2009 the] State Council and the Central
Committee of the Communist Party issued their first joint document of the year, which
reiterated that the development of agriculture and rural areas in 2009 was of special
significance” (Xinhua News Agency, 2009).
Indeed, the government’s response to the winter drought is indicative of the
seriousness with which it takes water issues. Beijing declared a state of emergency as a result
of the winter drought, and has earmarked some 400 million RMB for drought relief (Xinhua
News Agency, 2009). State media coverage also highlighted government investment in water
management, including an investment of some 62 billion RMB in rural water conservation
from 2000-2008 (Xinhua News Agency, 2009). Government water officials further reiterated
their intention to “strengthen control” of water resources, and to implement conservation
practices (Xinhua News Agency, 2009).
Much of this effort seems to be specifically motivated by concerns for food and water
security. In statements to the press, China’s Minister for Water Resources stressed the need
to redress inequities in the distribution of water resources to urban and rural residents
(Beijing Qingnian Bao, 2009). Premier Wen Jiabao similarly emphasized the need to provide
peasants with economic security and stability in a time of drought, saying "It's of vital
significance to the overall economy to boost steady growth of grain production and farmers'
income" (Xinhua News Agency, 2009). State media further repeated the theme of uneven
access, including one report illustrating a peasant who pays five times the urban price of
water just a few kilometres away (Hun, 2009).
Paralleling this focus on water security is an even more long-standing preoccupation
with the fear that water shortages will impair food security. In mid-2008, state media
reported that “With food and water security becoming great concerns around the world,
China will take measures to ensure agricultural water use and promote its plan to increase
food production,” including raising the price of water (Wang W. , 2008). China further
appears to take the issue of water availability in the Himalaya seriously, flying several cloudseeing sorties a month to increase rainfall and water availability on the Tibet-Qinghai Plateau
(Zha, 2009). Perhaps the clearest statement of the government’s linkage of water and
security issues, however, is the National Framework for Medium to Long-Term Food
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Security, released in 2008, which emphasizes water-saving agriculture and conversation
(Xinhua News Agency, 2009).
Chinese discourse on climate, water, and security is clouded. As this section has
indicated, there remains a high-level reticence to link climate change issues and security.
However, some commentators have instead emphasized these linkages. Moreover, at the
domestic level, official voices have expressed particular concern over inequities in water
resource distribution, as well as potential implications for food security. The net result is that
it is reasonable to assume China’s foreign and security policy framework has not been
broadened to include climate-related impacts. Given the manifold strategic challenges these
impacts will pose for China, as outlined in the last section, this is of some concern. With this
in mind, this paper turns to its conclusions, which include implications for global climate
change cooperation and negotiations.
Conclusions: A Way Forward for Climate, Water, and Security in China and Asia
This paper has attempted to probe the intersection of climate, water, and security. In the
process, it has examined the physical science basis of water-related climate change impacts,
their security implications, and Chinese political and security discourse. In many ways, this
is uncharted academic terrain. Scientific assessments of climate change and its impact on
hydrological systems are subject to large uncertainties, while the security and political
dimensions of the climate issue exist in a fluid context of popular and elite opinion.
Nonetheless, this paper has advanced a consistent theme, namely that water-related climate
change impacts will increasingly bear on China’s security, foreign relations, and political
discourse.
Beneath this over-arching conclusion, this analysis has uncovered several crosscutting issues at the intersection of climate, water, and security. First among them is
uncertainty. The climate system is incredibly complex, making precise scientific assessment
of climate change impacts, particularly on water, extremely difficult. Indeed, one of the most
confident predictions that can be made is that climate change will increase the variability in
precipitation patterns. As a result of this fundamental uncertainty, the security implications
of such change center on grave but general threats to stability, including large-scale
migration, decreasing agricultural water availability, and increased risk of catastrophic
flooding. Such uncertainty makes tinges climate security studies with a generic air. But this
does not detract from their gravity: as security analyst James Stuhltrager has noted, climate
change fundamentally represents uncertainty and risk, both of which are integral to security
assessment and planning (Stuhltrager, 2008).
A second inter-related issue deals with acute regional impacts. It is clear that specific
regions, such as the Mekong River, parts of the Indian Himalaya and northwest China, will be
more severely impacted by changes in hydrology under climate change. In most such cases,
these ecological impacts will be exacerbated by social, economic, and political factors; in the
Mekong, water management is hampered by transboundary political disputes, while in
northwest China ethnic tensions and poverty enhance the threat of climate-hydrological
changes. Thus, the political-security implications of such changes are likely to be centered
on several specific “hot spot” regions.
The third and final major cross-cutting issue identified in this analysis is that waterrelated climate change impacts will strain the capacity of Chinese institutions and policy
frameworks. This is particularly evident with respect to the military’s natural disaster
response capabilities and transboundary water management policy, as well as with domestic
agricultural, emergency management, and water management policies. The Chinese
government, perhaps with the increased aid of international and civil society actors, will be
pressed to improve its conceptual, planning and implementation capacities in each of these
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policy areas. While Chinese discourse provides evidence of a foundation for developing such
capacities, they are unlikely to be sufficient to deal with the full scale of the climate change
challenge. Finally, China will be forced to devote large economic resources to adaptation,
including the construction of flood defenses, reservoirs, and water distribution systems, if it is
to escape the worst water-related climate change impacts. At a time when China’s
development priorities demand investment in so many areas, this investment is almost certain
to increase political tensions.
With these observations more fully articulated, this paper can at last approach the
issue of implications for global cooperation on climate change. Before doing so, a caveat is
appropriate. It is evident that, from the perspective of China and most other developing
countries, the climate issue is defined primarily by political and economic issues. China’s
stated goals for the Copenhagen climate change conference, for example, emphasize
adaptation and technology transfer, with funding responsibilities borne entirely by developed
nations (National Development and Reform Commission, 2009).
These points of contention, rather than security or strategic dialogue, will define
upcoming global climate negotiations. Indeed, Chinese leaders may continue to resist linking
climate change and its national security, since as scholars have long noted there is little risk
that climate change will foster interstate violence, the traditional focus of security (Deudney,
1990, p. 461). There is thus a limit to the benefit to be gained by “securitizing” the issue of
climate change. However, this paper’s conclusion that water-related security issues will be of
increasing importance under climate change carries at least three significant implications for
global climate cooperation.
First, water-related security issues present a particularly good opportunity to broaden
and deepen bilateral and regional cooperation on climate change. Fundamentally, it presents
an opportunity for strategic dialogue on the long-term impacts of climate change, rather than
shorter-term disagreements over technology transfer or verifiable emissions reductions.
Acute institutional vulnerabilities, such increased strain on emergency management and
disaster response capabilities in China, present opportunities for international technical
assistance and cooperation. A recent Council on Foreign Relations paper, for example,
recommends that the US military integrate climate-related extreme weather response into its
regional command structure (Busby, 2007, p. 21); building dialogue between such
commands, their Chinese and other Asian counterparts could dramatically improve the
efficacy of international disaster response efforts.
This kind of cooperation could be further strengthened by focusing developed-country
climate adaptation funding to address acute strategic issues. For example, the US Agency for
International Development has launched a program in cooperation with the Gates Foundation
to develop new rice varieties capable of surviving various climate change-related stresses,
thereby enhancing food security throughout South Asia. The USD$35 million project will
focus on enabling farmers in the region to obtain higher rice yields even in the face of climate
change, and with fewer inputs of fertilizer and irrigated water (US Federal News Service,
2009). Similar models could be explored, possibly with a greater degree of co-financing, in
China.
Additionally, a recent cooperative venture between the Chinese Academy of Sciences
and the US Department of Agriculture illustrates how bilateral technical assistance can focus
on ameliorating water-related climate change impacts. The program, founded in 2005, is
focused on preventing erosion in China’s Loess Plateau, which is expected to experience
severe flooding under climate change. Cooperative modeling between the two agencies
identified no-till farming practices that can reduce soil loss by 85% under climate change,
helping protect farmers from economic and ecological destruction (Zhang & Liu, 2008, p.
22A). Replicating similar programs can help target adaptation funding to averting the worst
32

hydrological impacts of climate change (and attendant security effects), while also expanding
bilateral climate cooperation.
The third and final implication of this analysis for global climate cooperation is to
view such cooperation not only as an ecological imperative, but also as a strategic one. As a
Council on Foreign Relations report has noted, international climate negotiations have a clear
national security dimension, inasmuch as the international community has an interest in
integrating nations like China and India into a “rules-based global order” through
participation in climate negotiations (Busby, 2007, p. 19). This interest is heightened when
the security ramifications of climate change, such as have been detailed in this paper, are
considered. Fundamentally, these ramifications serve to highlight the fact that climate
change impacts, both water and other, will reverberate across borders and traditional
disciplinary distinctions between science, politics, and security. High-level security dialogue
between China, the United States, and other countries can serve as a focal point for such
discussions, and can be a component of existing initiatives, such as the US-sponsored Major
Economies Process on Energy and Climate.
Climate change and its consequences will cast a growing shadow over international
politics and relations in the coming years. Much about the issue is uncertain, but it seems
safe to assert that policymakers and analysts in a wide variety of fields will be compelled to
pay more attention to climate issues. This analysis is intended as a first step towards probing
the issues involved for such actors at the intersection of climate change, water, and security,
especially with respect to China and Asia. It will almost certainly, however, not be the last.
Scientific assessments of climate change impacts are likely to improve in accuracy and detail,
as is the analysis of the political, social, and strategic issues entailed in climate change. Such
work is essential for sharpening the focus of this paper- to think broadly and critical about the
manifold consequences of climate change, for China, Asia, and the world at large.
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